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CASENOTES
THE CREDIBILITY DISTINCTION IN KROGER CO. v. MORRIS
I. INTRODUCTION
The opinion issued by the court of appeals in Kroger Co. v. Morris1 was
both short and, in light of precedent, predictable. The practical conse-
quences of the reasoning used by the court in this and similar cases, how-
ever, may be much less predictable than is desirable. The case concerned
a Virginia Worker's Compensation Commission decision that contained a
finding regarding the credibility of a witness which contradicted the find-
ing of the deputy commissioner who presided at the hearing. The court of
appeals held that it is permissible for the worker's Compensation Com-
mission to make a credibility finding which differs from that of the dep-
uty, so long as the deputy's finding was based on the substance of the
witness' testimony rather than the appearance or demeanor of the wit-
ness. The distinction the court has made between "demeanor credibility"
and "substance credibility" has theoretical appeal to the extent that the
two types of credibility differ, as "demeanor credibility" can only be eval-
uated by one who has actually observed the witness, while "substance
credibility" can be determined from the written record alone. The pos-
sibilities, however, that deputies may not specify which type of credibility
has influenced their determinations, that deputies might not be aware of
the extent to which each type has influenced their decisions, and that
demeanor may in any event be an unreliable indicator of veracity, call
into question the court's credibility distinction.
II. FACTS
Mr. Morris was employed as a tractor-trailer driver for Kroger Com-
pany and claimed that he injured his shoulder on September 3, 1990,
while unloading milk from his truck during a delivery to a Kroger store.
Mr. Morris experienced a sudden pain in his shoulder while pushing a
twenty-four-gallon stack of milk cartons from a two-wheel hand truck
1. 14 Va. App. 233, 415 S.E.2d 879 (1992).
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onto a metal pan.2 He reported the injury to co-workers and the store
manager and was unable to work for the next two days until he sought
treatment from Dr. LaBarbera, a chiropractor.3
While taking Mr. Morris' patient history, Dr. LaBarbera recorded that
the "[p]atient stated that he injured himself on-the-job.[sic]' 4 Mr. Morris
was then referred to Dr. Watts who likewise noted that the cause of in-
jury was work-related.5 Dr. Watts referred Mr. Morris to Dr. Spetzler, an
orthopedic surgeon. Unlike the observations of the preceding doctors, Dr.
Spetzler's report did not contain a clear description of the cause of the
injury. Rather, Dr. Spetzler noted that "[h]e says that he does not re-
member any one accident but he noted some soreness with pushing milk
on the buggies."' Dr. Spetzler determined that Mr. Morris suffered from
both a rotator cuff tear and cystic swelling. After surgically repairing the
shoulder joint, Dr. Spetzler noted "I did tell Mr. Morris that his work-
related incident is really an aggravation of a chronic problem rather than
any one incident of trauma." Dr. Spetzler concluded that "[a] chronic
silent tear can become symptomatic through an aggravation and I think
that this is what has happened in Mr. Morris' case."' 7 Mr. Morris subse-
quently filed a Workers' Compensation claim against the Kroger
Company.
Deputy Commissioner Costa, who heard the case, denied Mr. Morris
disability benefits, finding that Morris lacked credibility and that he
failed to prove that his disability was caused by the incident he described
in his testimony. The credibility finding was based on the fact that Mor-
ris described the injury-causing event with more specificity while testify-
ing than he had when he consulted his doctors.8
The full Commission reversed and awarded temporary total disability
benefits.' Rather than focusing on inconsistencies among Morris' descrip-
tions of his injury, the Commission's opinion highlighted the conclusions
of two of Morris' doctors:10
2. Id. at 234, 415 S.E.2d at 880.
3. Id. at 234-35, 415 S.E.2d at 880.
4. Id. at 235, 415 S.E.2d at 880.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id. at 234-35, 415 S.E.2d at 880.
8. "Deputy Commissioner Costa found it hard to believe that the claimant could provide
specific details of a particular event during direct examination, yet had not provided this
same information to the various treating physicians." Id. at 236, 415 S.E.2d at 881.
9. Id.
10. The commission expressly decided not to consider the comments of Mr. Morris' first
doctor: "The causation noted by Dr. LaBarbera in his Attending Physician's Report of Oc-
tober 8, 1990, is not persuasive inasmuch as the history reflected in his report is too general
to establish an injury by accident as that term is construed in worker's compensation cases."
Va. Indus. Comm'n File No. 148-65-75 at 131.
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Dr. Watts noted by history "Patient states that he was unloading milk and
strained his left shoulder" and related the diagnosed condition to that acci-
dent. However, we place the greatest emphasis on the reports of Dr. Spet-
zler. While he repeatedly stated that there was no sudden accident, the con-
trary is shown by the record. Dr. Spetzler's reports establish that the
claimant suffered from an old rotator cuff tear which apparently was
asymptomatic until aggravated by the industrial accident of September 3,
1990.11
The Commission did not explicitly reject Deputy Commissioner Costa's
credibility finding;12 nevertheless, it concluded that the injury occurred in
an industrial accident "at a specific time and place while the claimant
was performing strenuous work.""
Ill. THE COURT'S REASONING
The Court of Appeals affirmed the findings of the full Commission, de-
spite Kroger's contention that the Commission had erred by ignoring the
deputy commissioner's conclusion that Mr. Morris lacked credibility.
4
The court explained that though the Commission could not arbitrarily
disregard credibility findings based on witness appearance or demeanor,
the Commission was entitled to substitute its own judgment for the dep-
uty's if the determination was based on the substance of the testimony. 5
Kroger next argued that Morris failed to prove that his alleged indus-
trial accident was the actual source of his injury. In response the court
pointed out, using language virtually identical to that in Morris v. Badger
Powhatan/Figgie International, Inc.'6 that the court of appeals may not
11. Id.
12. The commission had only the following to say on the subject:
Upon this record, the Deputy Commissioner denied compensation essentially upon a
finding of credibility. The Deputy Commissioner noted that the claimant described a
specific incident at the hearing on February 5, 1991, but only generally described his
work activity to Dr. Watts. Dr. Spetzler reported on September 11, 1990, that the
claimant noted soreness while pushing milk on the buggies. The Deputy Commis-
sioner further noted that the claimant completed a sickness and accident insurance
form on October 16, 1990, in which he stated that his injury occurred while unloading
milk cartons. However, this is what the claimant testified at the February 5, 1991
hearing.
Id. at 130.
13. Id. at 131.
14. 5 Va. App. 374, 363 S.E.2d 433 (1987). In Goodyear Tire, the court reversed a decision
of the commission (then called the Industrial Commission of Virginia) which had reversed a
deputy commissioner's credibility finding based on the claimant's demeanor and evasiveness
while testifying. For the court's exact language regarding credibility determinations, see
supra note 12 and accompanying text.
15. Kroger, 14 Va. App. at 236, 415 S.E.2d at 880-81. The court cited Goodyear Tire and
Rubber Co. v. Pierce as precedent supporting its decision.
16. 3 Va. App. 276, 279, 348 S.E.2d 876, 877 (1986).
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disturb the Commission's findings.1" Because Mr. Morris' testimony re-
garding his injury was similar to what he told to Drs. LaBarbera and
Watts, and because Dr. Spetzler determined that Morris' injury had "be-
come symptomatic through an aggravation," the court concluded that
"the evidence support[ed] the finding of the full commission." 8
IV. ANALYSIS: THE IMPLICATIONS OF FINDINGS (SUPPOSEDLY) BASED ON
CREDIBILITY
The court's ruling in this case seems quite straightforward in light of
the precedents set by Goodyear Tire and Rubber Co. v. Pierce and Mor-
ris v. Badger Powhatan/Figgie International, Inc. The Virginia Worker's
Compensation Commission is not constrained by a deputy commissioner's
credibility finding so long as that finding was based on the substance of
the witness' testimony rather than his demeanor or appearance. However,
the Commission's determination is binding on the court of appeals, so
long as it is supported by credible evidence.19 The question that remains,
however, despite the predictability of the court's explanation, is how well
it conforms with the realities of administrative hearings and full Commis-
sion review.
In Goodyear Tire and Rubber v. Pierce, the court distinguished be-
tween credibility findings based on witness demeanor and those based on
the substantive testimony.
When the deputy commissioner's finding of credibility is based, in whole or
in part, upon the claimant's appearance and demeanor at the hearing, the
commission may have difficulty reversing that finding without recalling the
witness. On the other hand, if the deputy commissioner's determination of
credibility is based on the substance of the testimony and not upon the
witness' demeanor and appearance, such a finding is as determinable by the
full commission as by the deputy.20
Thus, the court views the credibility issue as falling into one of two rather
distinct categories. The first category concerns a witness' presentation of
his testimony, including inferences drawn from his appearance and his
behavior. The second involves issues regarding the believability of the
17. Kroger, 14 Va. App. at 237, 415 S.E.2d at 881.
18. Id.
19. Although the court's use of the phrase "credible evidence" might be confusing due to
the importance attached to credibility in this case, subsequent cases clearly state the appli-
cable standard: "[t]he reviewing court may reject the agency's finding of fact only if, consid-
ering the record as a whole, a reasonable mind would necessarily come to a different conclu-
sion." Johnston-Willis Ltd. v. Kenley, 6 Va. App. 231, 242, 369 S.E.2d 1, 7 (1988) (citing
Kenley v. Waterway Estates, Ltd., 3 Va. App. 50, 56, 348 S.E.2d 31, 34 (1986)) and Virginia
Real Estate Commission v. Bias, 226 Va. 264, 269, 308 S.E.2d 123, 125 (1983).
20. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Pierce, 5 Va. App. 374, 383, 363 S.E.2d 433, 438
(1987).
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story based on its content, regardless of how the story is presented. In the
first category, credibility of a witness can only be observed by the per-
son(s) presiding at the hearing; while in the second category, credibility
can be gleaned from the written record alone. It further appeals that the
court not only views the two categories as separate and distinct, but also
assumes that deputy commissioners will specify whether the appearance
and demeanor of the witness or the believability of the testimony influ-
enced their credibility determination.
To some extent the court's expectation that deputy commissioners will
identify the basis of their credibility findings is probably a sensible one,
for "on the issue of veracity the bearing and delivery of a witness will
usually be the dominating factors, when the words alone leave any ra-
tional choice. 21 Presumably, deputy commissioners often include in their
opinions their reasons for believing or disbelieving witnesses. Conceiva-
bly, however, situations will arise in which the evidence standing alone,
without consideration of the witness' manner, is neither inherently believ-
able nor unbelievable and in which "demeanor credibility" is neither con-
spicuously present nor absent. Is it reasonable to expect in such situa-
tions that the deputy commissioner will rationalize her credibility
findings so explicitly that the Commission will know just what level of
deference to give to her factfinding on review. And even if the deputy
explains the basis of her findings, can the Commission really be sure that
her failure to mention demeanor means that it did not factor into her
determination at all? It is likely that in "close" cases, triers of fact rely
more on demeanor credibility than they are aware or perhaps more than
they are willing to admit. If this presumption is correct, then the court's
strict distinction between demeanor and believability is precarious.
Conversely, regardless of the frequency with which factfinders depend
on evaluations of demeanor, it is arguably an unreliable indicator of ve-
racity.22 Thus, there may be little danger in the possibility that a deputy
21. NLRB v. Universal Camera Corp., 190 F.2d 429, 429 (2d Cir. 1951).
22. Examples in legal literature of the contention that demeanor is an unreliable indicator
of veracity include Penasquitos Village, Inc. v. NLRB, 565 F.2d 1074, 1084 (1977) (Duniway,
J., dissenting) and Marcus Stone, Instant Lie Detection? Demeanor and Credibility in
Criminal Trials, 1991 CRim L. REv. 821. Perhaps even more important, however, is what
psychologists have discovered about our ability to evaluate sincerity based on demeanor.
The results of the psychological studies call into question the judicial reliance on
common sense to assess the credibility of witnesses. Simply put, the studies systemat-
ically and effectively expose the notion of common sense as a myth. They reveal that
lay persons rely much on misconceptions and erroneous assumptions in assessing the
credibility of others.
Steven J. Friedland, On Common Sense and the Evaluation of Witness Credibility, 40 CAsE
W. REs. L. REv. 165, 187 (1990). Behavior researcher Paul Eckman explains: "Our research,
like the research of most others, has found that few people do better than chance in judging
whether someone is lying or truthful. We also found that most people think they are making
accurate judgments even though they are not." PAUL EcKmAN, TELLING Lms (1985). Kristine
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commissioner's opinion might not specifically state her reliance on the
behavior of the witness. Appellate review in such cases would necessarily
focus on other issues, and an incorrect evaluation of demeanor would be
neutralized as a result.
The absence of a stated basis for credibility findings in the opinions of
deputy commissioners might also induce the full Commission to more
clearly set forth its motive of creating, changing, or elaborating upon
commission policy. What may in fact be occurring in cases like Kroger Co.
v. Morris is that the Commission is in effect making policy when it is
talking about credibility. The opinion in Kroger Co. v. Morris sends a
message that deputies do not need a high degree of certainty as to
whether the claimed industrial accident is the cause of the worker's injury
as was amended by Deputy Commissioner Costa. There was no question
that Mr. Morris suffered a shoulder injury; the only question was whether
the incident he described caused the injury. Deputy Commissioner
Costa's credibility finding in Kroger Co. v. Morris simply showed he was
not certain that the injury occurred on September 3, 1990, while Mr.
Morris was unloading milk. Certainly the Commission respects its deputy
enough that its opinion in the case was meant to explain that it should be
the policy of deputy commissioner or to award benefits despite a degree
of uncertainty rather than to claim that this particular deputy should
have been more convinced by what he observed.
Indeed, it is "perfectly proper for agency heads to use individual cases
to elaborate on, or to change, agency policy. ' 23 However, a court review-
ing a commission decision should demand that the commission more
clearly explain that it is making or illustrating policy. Otherwise, the
court is left to ascertain the substantiality of evidence that had little
bearing on the commission's decision.
In reviewing the full Commission's objectives in reversing a deputy's
findings, two other considerations warrant attention. First, the Commis-
C. Landry and John C. Brigham add: "[P]eople who might be expected to have professional
experience in detecting deceit, such as law enforcement officers and customs agents, have
generally performed at the same level as ordinary citizens." Kristine C. Landry and John C.
Brigham, The Effect of Training in Criteria-Based Content Analysis on the Ability to De-
tect Deception in Adults, 16 LAW & HUM. BEHAv. 663, 664 (1992).
23. STEPHEN G. BREYER & RICHARD B. STEWART, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND REGULATORY
POLICY 209 (2d ed. 1985); see also, Summary of Action of the House of Delegates, Feb. 18-
19, 1985, A.B.A. Szc. ADMIN. L. REP. 301 at 7 ("Resolved, That the American Bar Association
approves the following principles respecting the choice between rulemaking and adjudica-
tion in administrative agency proceedings: 1. An agency is generally free to announce new
policy through an adjudicative proceeding.") But see KENNETH C. DAvis, ADMINISTRATIVE
LAW TREATISE § 14.5 (2d ed. 1980) ("Although agencies have and have to have authority to
make law through adjudication, and although their lawmaking power cannot feasibly be lim-
ited to rulemaking, they still should do what they can to use rulemaking as the main proce-
dure for creating new law or new policy.") (citation omitted).
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sion's inclination to completely disregard deputy commissioner findings,
even for the sake of policy making, runs counter to the purpose of having
deputy commissioners rather than the full Commission conduct the initial
hearings. Second, the policy making activities of the Commission should
be balanced against the extent to which deputies act as a check on the
possible bias of the commissioners.2 4 It is the duty of the court of appeals,
the only body that has the authority to monitor the adjudicatory function
of the Worker's Compensation Commission in individual cases, to ensure
that the Commission gives proper weight to its deputies' opinions. This
means that the Commission must be explicit in both its delineation of
policy and its reliance upon deputy factfinding.
Another consideration arising from the court's holding is the possibility
that deputy commissioners may manipulate the credibility distinction to
avoid reversal or provide unfair advantage to one of the parties. Also, at-
torneys on both sides might vigorously argue demeanor credibility issues,
real or imagined, in hopes of iliciting an opinion that the full Commis-
sion is unlikely to disturb. After all, it is very rare for the Commission to
recall witnesses in order to make its own credibility determinations.
2 5
V. CONCLUSION
In recognizing the difficulties inherent in reviewing "another person's
conclusion from evidence that has disappeared,"2 the court of appeals
has chosen to allow the Workers Compensation Commission to determine
the amount of deference that should be given to deputy commissioner
factfinding on the basis of the type of credibility mentioned in the dep-
uty's opinion. Certainly some standard is necessary to ensure that the
Commission does not arbitrarily disregard the deputy's observations. It
seems, however, that the credibility distinction utilized by the court and
the Commission places too much emphasis on the slippery concept of
24. See STEPHEN G. BREYER & RICHARD B. STEWART, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND REGULA-
TORY POLICY 209 (2d ed. 1985) (explaining that the federal Administrative Procedure Act
created the office of hearing examiner in part to guard against agency commissioner bias).
25. Telephone interview with Susan Smith, legal intern with the Virginia Workers Com-
pensation Commission (Nov. 15, 1992). See also THE VIRGINIA WORKERS COMPENSATION AcT
ANNOTATED 232 (1991) (Rule 2C of the Virginia Worker's Compensation Commission):
No new evidence may be introduced by a party at the time of Review except on
agreement of the parties. Any petition for reopening of the case and taking of addi-
tional testimony will only be favorably acted upon by the Full Commission when it
appears to the Commission that such course is absolutely necessary and advisable
and also when the party requesting the same is able to conform to the rules prevailing
in the courts of the State for the introduction of after-discovered evidence.
Id. (emphasis added).
26. NLRB v. Universal Camera Corp. (I), 179 F.2d 749, 753 (1950) (referring to the de-
meanor and conduct of witnesses that was only observed by the hearing officer).
1993]
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credibility, and too little emphasis on the actual objectives of commission
decisions.
Nicole Rovner Beyer
